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Abstract. In a competitive environment, switching costs have two effects. First, they
increase the market power of a seller with locked-in customers. Second, they increase com-
petition for new customers. I provide conditions under which switching costs decrease or
increase equilibrium prices. Taken together, the suggest that, if markets are very com-
petitive to begin with, then switching costs make them even more competitive; whereas if
markets are not very competitive to begin with, then switching costs make them even less
competitive. In the above statements, by “competitive” I mean a market that is close to a
symmetric duopoly or one where the sellers’ discount factor is very high.
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1. Introduction
Consumers frequently must pay a cost in order to switch from their current supplier to
a different supplier (Klemperer, 1995; Farrell and Klemperer, 2007). These costs suggest
some interesting questions: are markets more or less competitive in the presence of switching
costs? Are prices higher or lower under switching costs? How do seller profits and consumer
surplus vary as switching costs increase?
Empirical evidence regarding these questions is ambiguous: although most studies sug-
gest that switching costs lead to higher prices, there is also evidence to the contrary. This
ambiguity is mirrored by the theoretical literature: some papers provide sufficient conditions
such that switching costs make markets less competitive, with others predict the opposite
effect.
In this paper, I develop an analytical framework that is flexible enough to encompass
several possibilities, including pro-and anti-competitive effects of switching costs. In devel-
oping and analyzing this framework, I hope to provide intuition for some of the main effects
of switching costs of market competition.
Most of the previous economics literature has solved some variation of a simple two-
period model (see Section 2.3.1. in Farrell and Klemperer, 2007) The equilibrium of this
game typically involves a bargain-then-ripoff pattern: in the second period, the seller takes
advantage of a locked-in consumer and sets a high price (rip-off). Anticipating this second-
period profit, and having to compete against rival sellers, the first-period price is corre-
spondingly lowered (bargain). One limitation of two-period models is that potentially they
distort the relative importance of bargains and ripoffs. In particular, considering the nature
of many practical applications, two-period models unrealistically create game-beginning and
game-ending effects.
To address this problem, I consider an infinite-period model where the state variable
indicates the seller to which a given consumer is currently attached. The dynamic coun-
terpart of the bargain-then-ripoff pattern is given by two corresponding effects on a seller’s
dynamic pricing incentives: the harvesting effect (sellers with locked-in customers are able
to price higher without losing demand) and the investment effect (sellers without locked-in
customers are eager to cut prices in order to attract new customers).
The harvesting and investment effects work in opposite directions in terms of market
average price. Which effect dominates? Conventional wisdom and the received economics
literature suggest that the harvesting effect dominates (Farrell and Klemperer, 2007). How-
ever, recent research casts doubt on this assertion (e.g., Doganoglu, 2010; Dube´, Hitsch and
Rossi, 2007; Fabra and Garcia (2012)).1
In this paper, I attempt to clarify the issue by providing conditions under which switch-
ing costs decrease or increase equilibrium prices. The bottom line is that, if markets are
very competitive to begin with, then switching costs make them even more competitive;
whereas if markets are not very competitive to begin with, then switching costs make them
even less competitive. In the above statements, by “competitive” I mean a market that
is close to a symmetric duopoly or one where the discount factor is very high, so that the
competition for future customers is relatively more important than revenues from current
1. The idea that the effects of switching costs can be pro-competitive is not novel. See for example
von Weizsacker (1984) and Klemperer (1987) for seminal contributions and Cabral and Villas-Boas
(2005) for a reinterpretation of some of those results. Recent research has explored the competitive
effects of switching costs in an infinite-period context.
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customers. In other words, in very competitive markets the competition effect dominates,
whereas in concentrated markets the harvesting effect dominates.
As mentioned earlier, the idea that switching costs may have both a pro-competitive
and an anti-competitive effect is hardly novel. The value added by the present analysis
results form (a) using an infinite-period model, so that artificial “beginning of the world”
and “end of the world” effects are not present; (b) assuming buyers are rational, forward
looking agents (and allowing for the possibility that buyers discount the future differently
from sellers); (c) making very weak assumptions regarding functional forms (essentially,
assuming that marginal revenue increases in price).
Although fairly general in several dimensions, I restrict my analysis to the case when
sellers can discriminate between locked-in and not locked-in consumers. Examples of this
scenario include consumer goods such as magazine subscriptions and bank accounts.2 More
important, the assumption of customer discrimination is present in customer markets such
as ready-mixed concrete or wide-body aircraft, markets where sales contracts are typically
tailored to each customer.
Related literature. As mentioned earlier, two-period models suffer from various limi-
tations. To address these, a series of infinite-horizon models have been developed. In par-
ticular Beggs and Klemperer (1992) show that switching costs lead to higher equilibrium
prices. Farrell and Shapiro (1988), To (1995), and Padilla (1995) also consider infinite-
horizon models with overlapping generations of consumers. Broadly speaking, they obtain
similar results. My approach differs from theirs in two important ways. First, I assume
that switching costs are finite and that there is residual product differentiation, so that
switching occurs along the equilibrium path. Second, I consider the case when the seller is
able to discriminate between locked-in and not locked-in consumers.
Against this backdrop of dynamic models with predicted anti-competitive effects, a se-
ries of recent papers have shown that switching costs may lead to pro-competitive effects.
Dube´, Hitsch and Rossi (2009) show, by means of numerical simulations, that if switching
costs are small then the investment effect dominates, that is, switching costs increase mar-
ket competitiveness (see also Shin et al, 2009). I analytically solve a version of their model.
Analytical solution has three advantages. First, it leads to more general results, that is,
results that are not dependent on specific assumptions regarding functional forms and pa-
rameter values. Second, the process of solving the model leads to a better understanding
of the mechanics underlying the result that the average market price declines when switch-
ing costs increase. It also shows why there is an important difference between small and
large switching costs. Finally, an analytical model allows me to derive additional results
(Propositions 3–6) beyond the effect of small switching costs (Proposition 2).
Doganoglu (2010) considers the case of small switching costs and shows that, along the
equilibrium path, locked-in customers switch to the rival seller with positive probability.
Moreover, steady-state equilibrium prices are decreasing in switching costs. Doganoglu’s
(2010) approach differs from mine in various respects. He assumes uniformly distributed
preferences and linear pricing strategies; by contrast, I make very mild assumptions re-
garding the distribution of buyer preferences and the shape of the seller’s pricing strategies.
Moreover, my analysis goes beyond the case of small switching costs. Similarly to Doganoglu
(2010), Fabra and Garc´ıa (2012) develop a continuous-time dynamic model with switching
2. Klemperer (1995) suggests many other examples.
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costs and conclude that switching costs should only raise concerns in concentrated markets.
Four other recent papers on dynamics with switching costs are Arie and Grieco (2012);
Biglaiser, Cre´mer and Dobos (2010); Somaini and Einav (2012); and Pearcy (2011). Arie
and Grieco (2012) find an additional force toward a pro-competitive effect of switching
costs: marginal consumers with a small switching cost lead an incumbent seller to lower
price, even if this implies a lower margin on locked-in, loyal buyers. Biglaiser, Cre´mer
and Dobos (2010) consider the case when consumer switching cost varies across consumers.
They show that even low switching cost customers have value for the incumbent: when there
are more of them the incumbent’s profits increase. Moreover, an increase in the switching
costs of all consumers can lead to a decrease in the profits of the incumbent. Somaini and
Einav (2012) develop a model of dynamic price competition with switching costs. While
some of the features of their model are somewhat stylized, it has the important advantage
of allowing for a generic number of competitors and being analytically solved in closed form.
Like Somaini and Einav (2012), Pearcy (2011) considers the general n firm case and shows
that the effect of switching costs is the more competitive the larger the number of firms.
This result is consistent with the overall theme of the present paper, namely that switching
costs “amplify” market competitiveness: making competitive markets more competitive and
non-competitive markets less competitive. In fact, it adds an additional diminution to this
result, namely variations in the number of firms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sections 3–5, I consider the effect of
switching costs on price for different levels of the switching cost and discount factor assuming
that sellers are symmetric (aside from the switching cost). In Sections 6 and 7, I consider
the case of asymmetric market structures, either because one of the seller’s product is (on
average) better than the rival or because one of the sellers unilaterally creates a switching
cost. Section 8 discusses several possible extensions and Section 9 concludes the paper.
2. Model
Consider an industry where two sellers compete over an infinite number of periods for sales
to n infinitely lived buyers. Each buyer purchases one unit each period from one of the
sellers. A buyer’s valuation for seller i’s good is given by zi and known to the buyer only.
I assume that zi is distributed according to cdf Φ(zi), with a corresponding density φ(zi).
I assume that the valuations zi are sufficiently high that the buyer always purchases from
one of the sellers. Moreover, for now I assume that zi is i.i.d. across sellers and periods.
(Section 6 addresses the possibility that preferences are serially correlated.) Moreover —
and this a crucial element in the model — if the buyer previously purchased from seller j,
then his utility from buying from seller i in the current period is reduced by s, the cost of
switching between sellers.
In each period, sellers set prices simultaneously and then each buyer chooses one of the
sellers. I assume that sellers are able to discriminate between locked-in and not locked-
in buyers (that is, buyers who are locked in to the rival seller). Without further loss of
generality, I hereafter focus on the sellers’ competition for a particular buyer. I focus on
symmetric Markov equilibria where the state indicates which seller made the sale in the
previous period. I denote the seller who made a sale in the previous period (the “insider”
seller) with the subscript 1, and the other seller (the “ousider” seller) with the subscript 0.
Symmetry implies that the buyer’s continuation values from being locked in to seller i
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or seller j are the same. This greatly simplifies the analysis, for even forward looking buyers
need not compute any value function. (Sections 6 and 7 deal with asymmetric competition,
and I will then need to explicitly compute the buyer’s value function.) In each period the
buyer chooses the insider seller if and only if
z1 − p1 + β u1 ≥ z0 − p0 + β u0 − s (1)
where ui is the buyer’s expected discounted utility from being locked in to seller i and β is
the buyer’s discount factor.3 By symmetry, the value, starting next period, of being locked
in to the firm that the buyer is currently locked in is the same as the value of being locked
in to the other firm (that is, assuming that the switching cost has already been paid). For
this reason, u1 = u0.
4
Define
z ≡ z1 − z0 (2)
x ≡ p1 − p0 − s (3)
Then (1) may be re-written as z ≥ x. In words, x is the critical level of the buyer’s relative
preference z such that the buyer chooses the insider. Define by q1 and q0 the probability
that the buyer chooses the insider or the outsider, respectively. If z is distributed according
to F (z), then we have
q1 = 1− F (x)
q0 = F (x)
I make the following assumptions regarding the c.d.f. F and the corresponding density f :
Assumption 1. (i) F (z) is continuously differentiable; (ii) f(z) = f(−z); (iii) f(z) > 0, ∀z;
(iv) f(z) is unimodal; (v) F (z)/f(z) is strictly increasing.
Many distribution functions, including the Normal and the t, satisfy Assumption 1. In many
of the results that follow, I will use repeatedly the following lemma, which characterizes
several properties of F that follow from Assumption 1:
Lemma 1. Under Assumption 1, the following are strictly increasing in z:
F (z)2
f(z)
,
F (z)− 1
f(z)
,
2F (z)− 1
f(z)
Moreover, the following is increasing in z iff z > 0 (and constant in z at z = 0):(
1− F (z))2 +(F (z))2
f(z)
3. I will denote the sellers’ discount factor by δ. In many applications, it may make sense to assume
β = δ. However I distinguish between the buyer and the seller discount factor throughout. Among
other reasons, this has the advantage of better highlighting the role of forward looking by buyers vs
sellers.
4. In Sections 6 and 7, where I explicitly consider an asymmetric duopoly, the equality u1 = u0 no
longer holds and I will need to explicitly compute the buyer value functions.
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Proof: See Appendix.
In this paper, I will focus on symmetric Markov equilibria. My first result shows that
there exists only one such equilibrium.
Proposition 1. There exists a unique symmetric Markov equilibrium.
Proof: The seller value functions are given by
v1 =
(
1− F (x))(p1 + δ v1)+ F (x) δ v0
v0 = F (x)
(
p0 + δ v1
)
+
(
1− F (x)) δ v0 (4)
where δ is the seller’s discount factor. The corresponding first-order conditions are
−f(x)(p1 + δ v1)+ 1− F (x) + f(x) δ v0 = 0
−f(x)(p0 + δ v1)+ F (x) + f(x) δ v0 = 0
(Recall that, from (3), d xd p1 = 1 and
d x
d p0
= −1.) Solving for optimal prices, I get
p1 =
1− F (x)
f(x)
− δ V
p0 =
F (x)
f(x)
− δ V
(5)
where
V ≡ v1 − v0
Substituting (5) for p1, p0 in (4) and simplifying, I get
v1 =
(
1− F (x))2
f(x)
+ δ v0
v0 =
F (x)2
f(x)
+ δ v0
It follows that
x =
1− F (x)
f(x)
− F (x)
f(x)
− s = 1− 2F (x)
f(x)
− s (6)
V =
(
1− F (x))2
f(x)
− F (x)
2
f(x)
=
1− 2F (x)
f(x)
(7)
Equation (6) may be rewritten as
x+
2F (x)− 1
f(x)
= −s (8)
By Lemma 1, the left-hand side is strictly increasing in x, ranging from −∞ to +∞ as x
itself ranges from −∞ to +∞. This implies there exists a unique solution x. From (7),
there exists a unique V . Finally, from (5) there exist unique p0, p1.
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In the next sections, I offer sets of conditions under which switching costs lead to an
increase or a decrease in prices (and average price). In the next section, I show that average
price decreases (resp. increases) in switching costs if the initial value of the switching cost
is low (resp. high). In Section 4, I consider the case of a high discount factor. In Section 6
I consider the asymmetric case, that is, the case when one seller is known to have a better
product (in the eyes of the consumer). Finally, Section 7 considers the case when switching
costs are themselves asymmetric.
3. Switching cost and average price
My main goal is to characterize equilibrium pricing as a function of switching costs s. In
this section, I consider the case of small switching costs and prove that average price is
decreasing in s if s is small and increasing in s if s is large. Let p be the average price paid
by the buyer, that is,
p = q1 p1 + q0 p0
Proposition 2. If s is sufficiently small, then average price p is decreasing in switching cost
s. Conversely, if s is sufficiently large, then average price p is increasing in switching cost
s.
Proof: Lemma 1, (8), and the implicit function theorem imply that x is strictly decreasing
in s, ranging from 0 to −∞ as s ranges from 0 to +∞. I will thus consider the derivative
of average price with respect to x, from which I then derive the comparative statics with
respect to s. Average price is given by
p ≡ q1 p1 + q0 p0 =
(
1− F (x)) p1 + F (x) p0
Substituting (5) for p1, p0 and (7) for V , and simplifying, I get
p =
(
1− F (x))(1− F (x)
f(x)
− δ V
)
+ F (x)
(
F (x)
f(x)
− δ V
)
=
(
1− F (x))2
f(x)
+
F (x)2
f(x)
− δ V
=
(
1− F (x))2 + F (x)2
f(x)
+ δ
(
2F (x)− 1
f(x)
)
(9)
Lemma 1 implies that, at x = 0, the first term on the right-hand side of (9) is constant in
x; and that the second term on the right-hand side of (9) is increasing in x. It follows that,
if x is small, then
d p
d x > 0.
Consider now the case when x → −∞. Taking the derivative of (9) with respect to x;
then taking the limit x→ −∞; and noting that, as x→ −∞, F (x)→ 0 and 1−F (x)→ 1;
we get
lim
x→−∞
∂
∂ x
(1− F (x))2 + F (x)2
f(x)
+ δ
(
2F (x)− 1
f(x)
) = −(2 + lim
x→−∞
f ′(x)
f(x)
)
(1− δ) < 0
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where I use the fact that, as x→ −∞, f ′(x) > 0. It follows that, if x is sufficiently close to
−∞, then d pd x < 0.
Proposition 2 provides an analytical and function-form generalization of Figure 1 in
Dube´, Hitsch and Rossi (2009), where the authors show that average price is a U-shaped
function of s. To understand the intuition, it is useful to look at the sellers’ first-order
conditions. The insider seller’s value function is given by
v1 =
(
1− F (x))(p1 + δ v1)+ F (x) δ v0
where vi is seller i’s value. In words: with probability 1 − F (x), the insider seller makes
a sale. This yields a short-run profit of p1 and the continuation value of an insider, v1.
With probability F (x), the insider loses the sale, makes zero short run profits, and earns a
continuation value v0.
Maximizing with respect to p1, we get the insider seller’s first-order condition:
p1 =
1− F (x)
f(x)
− δ V (10)
where V ≡ v1 − v0 is the difference, in terms of continuation value, between winning
and losing the current sale. In other words, −δ V is the “cost,” in terms of discounted
continuation value, of winning the current sale.
Since q1 = 1− F (x) and P = p1 − p0 − s, we have d q1d p1 = f(x). It follows that (10) may
be re-written as
p1 − (−δ V )
p1
=
1
1
where 1 ≡ d q1d p1
p1
q1
. This is simply the “elasticity rule” of optimal pricing, with one dif-
ference: the future discounted value from winning the sale appears as a negative cost (or
subsidy) on price.
We thus have two forces on optimal price, which might denoted by “harvesting” and
“investing.” If the seller is myopic (δ = 0), then optimal price is given by the first term
in the right-hand side of (10). The greater the value of s, the smaller the value of x (as
shown in the proof of Proposition 2), and therefore the greater the value of p1. We thus
have harvesting, that is, a higher switching cost implies a higher price (by the insider seller,
which is the more likely seller).
Suppose however that δ > 0. Then we have a second effect, investing, which leads to
lower prices. The greater the value of s, the greater the difference between being an insider
and being an outsider, that is, the greater the value of V .
What is the relative magnitude of the harvesting and the investment effects on average
price? First notice that harvesting leads to a higher price by the insider but a lower by the
outsider. If fact, by symmetry, the effects are approximately of the same absolute value
when s is close to zero. To see this, consider the outsider’s first-order condition:
p0 =
F (x)
f(x)
− δ V (11)
The “static” component of the first-order condition (corresponding to δ = 0) moves in
the opposite direction of p1, as can be seen in (10). From a short-run point of view, the
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Figure 1
Switching cost and equilibrium price. Red lines represent seller prices; blue lines represent
average price.
p
s
p1
p0
p
switching cost s effectively introduces vertical product differentiation between the insider
and the outsider, which in turn leads the insider to increase price and the outsider to reduce
price by the same amount. This implies that, for s close to zero and in terms of average
price, the harvesting effects approximately cancel out, since for s = 0 insider and ousider
sell with equal probability.
Not so with the dynamic effect. In fact, as can be seen from (10) and (11), the “subsidy”
resulting from the value of winning is the same for insider and outsider; and, to the extent
that v1 > v0, the subsidy is positive for both players, that is, both want to price aggressively
so as to secure a better position in the future. It follows that the effect on average price is
unambiguously negative, and of first-order importance.
In other words, the harvesting effect is symmetric: the amount by which the insider
increases its price is the same as the amount by which the outsider lowers its price. However,
the investment effect is equal for both sellers — and negative.
Now consider the case when s is very high. A high value of s implies a low value of x,
which in turn implies a low value of F (x). In other words, a high s implies that the insider’s
probability of a sale, 1 − F (x), is close to 1. This implies that the average price paid by
the buyer is essentially determined by the insider’s price. Putting (5) and (8) together, we
derive that the insider’s price is given by
p1 =
1− δ − (1− 2 δ)F (x)
f(x)
As s → ∞, x → −∞ and p1 → ∞. This is the classic “ripoff” effect of switching costs:
once the insider locks in the buyer, if valuations and the cost of switching are very high
then the insider can set a very high price.
Figure 1 illustrates Proposition 2. (In this numerical illustration, I assume x is dis-
tributed according to a standardized normal.) On the horizontal axis, the value of switch-
ing cost varies from zero to positive values. On the vertical axis, three prices are plotted:
the insider’s price, the outsider’s price, and average price. As the figure shows, average
price is a U-shaped function of switching cost: for low values of s, higher switching costs
have a pro-competitive effect, whereas for higher values of s, higher switching costs have an
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anti-competitive effect.
In sum, Proposition 2 suggests that the effect of switching costs on prices is largely an
empirical question. Dube´, Hitsch and Rossi (2006) claim that, for various products, the
value of switching cost lies in the region when the net effect of switching costs is to decrease
average price.
In the next section, I add another dimension to the comparative statics of switching
costs and market competition. Specifically, I show that, if the discount factor is sufficiently
close to one, then switching costs lead to lower prices for any positive value of switching
costs.
4. High discount factor
In the previous section, I showed that, for any preference distribution F satisfying Assump-
tion 1 and any positive discount factor δ, average price is a U-shaped function of s. In this
section, I provide an alternative sufficient condition for competitive switching costs. I show
that, for any preference distribution F satisfying Assumption 1 and for any positive value
of the switching cost s, if the discount factor is sufficiently close to 1 then average price is
decreasing in s.5
Proposition 3. If δ is close to 1, then average price p is decreasing in switching cost s.
Proof: From (9),
lim
δ→1
p = 2
F (x)2
f(x)
Lemma 1 then implies that, if δ is sufficiently close to 1, then p is increasing in x. From the
proof of Proposition 2, x is decreasing in s. (Notice that that statement does not depend
on s being small.) The result then follows by the chain rule of differentiation.
Figure 2 illustrates Proposition 3. It plots average price as a function of s for various
values of δ. The curve corresponding to δ = .9 corresponds to that in Figure 1. It is U
shaped: for small values of s, average price is decreasing in s (Proposition 2). However, for
high values of s, average price becomes increasing in s. As we consider higher values of δ,
the U shape becomes more and more extended, so that, for a given range [0, s¯] of values of
s, average price eventually becomes uniformly decreasing in s (Proposition 3).
I next attempt to provide an intuitive explanation for Proposition 3. In the proof of
Proposition 1 and the discussion of Proposition 2, we saw that equilibrium prices are given
by
p1 =
1− F (x)
f(x)
− δ V
p0 =
F (x)
f(x)
− δ V
(12)
5. Villas-Boas (2006) shows that prices are higher if sellers are more forward-looking. I will return to
this paper in Section 8.
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Figure 2
Switching cost and equilibrium average price as a function of the sellers’ discount factor
p
s
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(As I mentioned earlier, this is just the “elasticity rule” with the added element that sellers
“subsidize” their cost by δ V .) We also saw that the seller value functions are given by
v1 =
(
1− F (x))(p1 + δ v1)+ F (x) δ v0
v0 = F (x)
(
p0 + δ v1
)
+
(
1− F (x)) δ v0
Substituting equilibrium prices into the value functions and simplifying we get
v1 =
(
1− F (x))2
f(x)
+ δ v0
v0 =
F (x)2
f(x)
+ δ v0
(13)
If δ = 0, seller value is given by short-run profit, the first term on the right-hand side of the
value functions. In a dynamic equilibrium, seller value is given by these short-term profits
plus δ v0, regardless of whether the seller wins or loses the current sale.
This is an important point and one worth exploring in greater detail. To understand
the intuition, it may be useful to think of an auction with two bidders with the same
valuations. Specifically, each better gets w if he wins the auctions and l if he loses. The
Nash equilibrium is for both bidders to bid w − l. If follows that equilibrium value is l for
both bidders (winner or loser). In other words, the extra gain a bidder receives from being
the winner, w − l, is bid away, so that a bidder can’t expect more than l.
In the dynamic game at hand the analog of l is the continuation value if the seller loses
the current sale, δ v0. So the idea is that all of the extra gain in terms of future value,
δ V = δ (v1 − v0), is bid away in terms of lower prices.
What does this imply in terms of equilibrium prices? From (19), we get
V = v1 − v0 =
(
1− F (x))2
f(x)
− F (x)
2
f(x)
=
1− F (x)
f(x)
− F (x)
f(x)
(14)
Substituting for V in (12) we get
lim
δ→1
p1 =
1− F (x)
f(x)
− V = F (x)
f(x)
(15)
10
Figure 3
In region A, an increase in switching costs leads to a lower average equilibrium price. In
regions A and B, average price is lower than it would be if switching costs were zero.
0
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But, as we can see from (12), the right-hand side of (15) is simply the equilibrium value of
p0 when δ = 0. In words, as the discount factor tends to 1, the insider’s price level converges
to the the outsider’s static price level (i.e., when δ = 0). But we know that, in a static
model, increasing vertical product differentiation (in particular, increasing the switching
cost) leads to a lower price by the “outsider” seller. That is, as we increase s from zero to
a positive value, keeping δ = 0, then the insider’s price increases and the outsider’s price
decreases. If s = 0, then equilibrium price is the same regardless of the value of δ. Finally,
putting it all together, we conclude that, as δ → 1 and s > 0, the high price is at the level
of the lower price when s = 0; and so switching costs lead to lower average price.
Numerical simulations. Figure 3 summarizes the main results in the paper so far. The
red curve represents the points at which the derivative of average price with respect to
switching cost is zero. At points to the SE of this curve, an increase in switching cost
implies a lower average price. Propositions 2 and 3 state two important properties of this
curve: points with s sufficiently small (Proposition 2) or δ sufficiently high (Proposition
3) belong to region A. The figure suggests that this characterization is “tight,” that is,
Propositions 2 and 3 describe the essential properties of the boundary of region A.
The results in Pearcy (2011), setting N = 2, imply a qualitatively similar figure. In
fact, as mentioned earlier, the idea that a low s or a high δ lead to a competitive effect of
switching costs is present in various papers. One important element added by my analysis
so far is to derive results that are largely independent of functional form assumptions. The
specific values of Figure 3 assume a specific functional form for z (standardized normal);
but Propositions 1–3 only require Assumption 1.
So far, I have examined how average price changes when switching costs increase. An
alternative interesting comparison is between average price with s > 0 and average price
when s = 0. The blue curve in Figure 3 depicts points such that average price is the same
as when s = 0. For points to the SE of this curve, average price is lower with switching
costs than without switching costs.
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5. Profits and welfare
So far I have been dealing with the the impact of switching costs on average price, one of the
central questions in the academic and public policy debate. What can be said about seller
profits and consumer welfare? Tentatively, Propositions 2 and 3 suggest that under some
conditions buyers are better off, and sellers worse off, with switching costs than without.
However, paying a lower price is only half of the story for a buyer. To the extent that there
is private information about preferences, switching actually occurs along the equilibrium
path. We must therefore subtract the costs from switching when considering expected
buyers surplus. As to the sellers, the fact that average price declines does not imply that
sellers are uniformly worse off with switching costs. In fact, as shown earlier, the insider
may be able to increase its price as a result of a higher switching cost. In sum, it is not
obvious whether switching costs benefit buyers and sellers. My next result provides some
answers to this question.
Proposition 4. If s is small, then there exist δ′(s) and δ′′(s), where 0 < δ′(s) < δ′′(s) < 1,
such that an increase in switching cost s leads to
1. An increase in the insider’s value if and only if δ < δ′(s).
2. A decrease in the outsider’s value for all δ.
3. A decrease in industry value (that is, the joint value of insider and outsider) for all
δ.
4. An increase in consumer surplus if and only if δ > δ′′(s).
5. A decrease in welfare for all δ.
Proof: See Appendix.
Note that one of the implications of Proposition 4 is that, if δ′(s) < δ < δ′′(s), then
all agents (insider, outsider, buyer) are worse off with switching costs than without.6 More
generally, Proposition 4 raises an interesting question: if switching costs are frequently
created by sellers; and if largely sellers lose as a result of switching costs; then why do
sellers create switching costs? Part of the answer to the question is given by point 1 in
Proposition 4: if δ is sufficiently small, then an increase in switching costs increases the
value of the incumbent seller. In Section 7 I take this issue of step further by considering
the possibility that one of the sellers unilaterally increases the cost of switching away from
its product.
6. Customer recognition
In the preceding sections I have assumed that, other than the switching cost, sellers believe
that the consumer is on average indifferent between the two sellers. In real-world customer
markets, however, sellers typically know something about buyer preferences. I now explicitly
consider the possibility of customer recognition, that is, the possibility that sellers have
6. Biglaiser, Cre´mer and Dobos (2010) also show that an increase in the switching costs of all consumers
can lead to a decrease in the profits of the incumbent. However, this takes place in a different context
and for different reasons. See also Section 8.
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some information about buyer preferences.7 I model this by assuming that the buyer has a
preference for seller i that is given by zi, distributed according to cdf Φi(zi). In the previous
sections, I assumed that zi − zj is distributed according to a cdf F (z) which is symmetric
about zero. Now I assume that zA − zB = d+ z, where d is a constant common knowledge
to sellers and z is distributed according to a cdf F (z) which is symmetric about zero.
We now have buyer preferences that are serially correlated. This changes the problem
substantially. In particular, a buyer is no longer indifferent between being attached to one
seller or the other, for a buyer anticipates that, on average, one of the sellers will provide
higher utility. Specifically, a buyer currently locked in to seller A now prefers to stay with
that seller if and only if
d+ zA − p1A + β uA ≥ −s+ zB − p0B + β uB
By contrast, a buyer currently locked-in to seller B prefers to stay with that seller if and
only if
zB − p0B + β uB ≥ −s+ d+ zA − p1A + β uA
The critical values xi leading the buyer to purchase from seller i when seller i is the
insider are now given by
xA ≡ p1A − p0B − β (uA − uB)− s− d
xB ≡ p1B − p0A + β (uA − uB)− s+ d
(16)
As before, seller i (the insider) sells with probability q1i = 1− F (xi).
We now have two “forces” toward seller asymmetry: d and s. The first one is permanent
and favors one seller against the other (seller A, if d > 0). The second is transitory and
favors the insider against the outsider. As before, the question at hand is: what impact
does an increase in switching costs s have on the average price paid by the buyer? Contrary
to Propositions 2 and 3, my next result provides sufficient conditions such that switching
costs lead to higher prices:
Proposition 5. If d is sufficiently large, then an increase in switching cost s leads to an
increase in average price p¯ if and only if δ < δ′(d), where 0 < δ′(d) < 1.
Proof: See Appendix.
Although Proposition 5 predicts the opposite effect of an increase in s than Proposition
2, the underlying mechanism is the same. The “harvesting” effect of an increase in switching
cost is to increase the insider’s price and decrease the outsider’s. If d = 0 (as Proposition
2 assumes) then the two effects cancel out at s = 0 and are of second order for s close to
zero. The reason is that, at s = 0, insider and outsider sell with equal probability; that
is, in terms of average price, the insider and the outsider prices weigh equally. If d > 0,
however, then the insider’s price is the main determinant of average price. In the limit as
d→∞, it is the only determinant of average price. It follows that the net harvesting effect
is to increase average price. Moreover, this effect is of first order. It follows that, unless δ is
7. Chen and Pearcy (2010) also allow for customer recognition. Specifically, they model the joint dis-
tribution of consumer preferences over time with a copula to parametrize the degree of temporal
dependence in preferences. For additional models with customer recognition, see Chen (1997), Villas-
Boas (1999, 2006), Fudenberg and Tirole (2000), Taylor (2003), Doganoglu (2005).
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high enough, then the harvesting effect dominates and average price increases as the result
of an increase in s.
Proposition 5 is in line with the finding in Fabra and Garcia (2012) that “switching
costs should only raise concerns in concentrated markets.” In fact, a market with high d is a
“concentrated” market, if we focus on the particular customer with high d. But Proposition
5 is about the value of d, not the distribution of market shares. It is conceivable that overall
market shares are 50–50 and still the effect of switching costs is very anticompetitive.
Closed-form solution. For most of the paper I have made minimal assumptions regard-
ing the distribution of F (z). The disadvantage of that approach is that no analytical closed
form solution is feasible. If we make additional assumptions, then a closed-form solution
may be possible. Specifically, suppose that z is uniformly distributed. Without further loss
of generality, suppose that F (z) = 12 + z.
8 Suppose also that β = 0. Then a closed-form
solution can be derived for all values of d (seller A’s advantage) and s (switching cost). The
solution is given by (see Appendix for details)
xA = −1
3
s−
(
3− 8
3
δ s
)−1
d
xB = −1
3
s+
(
3− 8
3
δ s
)−1
d
p1A =
1
2
+
1− 2 δ
3
s+
3− 4 δ s
9− 8 δ s d
p0A =
1
2
− 1 + 2 δ
3
s+
3− 4 δ s
9− 8 δ s d
p1B =
1
2
+
1− 2 δ
3
s− 3− 4 δ s
9− 8 δ s d
p0B =
1
2
− 1 + 2 δ
3
s− 3− 4 δ s
9− 8 δ s d
Computing the steady state average price is a little more difficult. For most of the paper
I considered variations around s = 0 (and d = 0), so that all prices have equal weight. Not
so when d, s > 0. Now I need to derive the steady-state probability that each price is
actually charged. Specifically, the steady state average price is given by
p¯ =
∑
i=A,B
µi(q1i p1i + q0j p0j)
(j 6= i) where µi is the steady-state probability that seller i is the insider. In the linear case,
q1i =
1
2 − xi. Moreover, the steady state probabilities µi solve the system [µA µB] M =
[µA µB], where M , the Markov transition matrix, has q1i in the main diagonal and q0j in
the off-diagonal terms, i = A,B, j 6= i. This implies that
µi =
1
2 + xj
1 + xi + xj
8. Strictly speaking, this functional form violates pars (i) and (iii) of Assumption 1. However, these
do not play a crucial role in Proposition 5 or the analytical derivation that follows. Moreover, one
can think of a smooth approximation to the uniform distribution that satisfies all of the parts of
Assumption 1.
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Figure 4
Switching cost and average price: linear case (F (z) = 12 + z, δ = .5, β = 0)
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i = A,B, j 6= i. We thus conclude that average price in the steady state is given by
p¯ =
∑
i=A,B
1
2 + xj
1 + xi + xj
((
1
2
− xi
)
p1i +
(
1
2
+ xi
)
p0j
)
Figure 4 plots equilibrium price as a function of switching cost s for various values of
firm A’s product advantage, d.9 The case when d = 0 corresponds to the case considered in
Section 3. Consistent with Proposition 2, we see that average price is a U-shaped function of
switching cost: switching costs are pro-competitive for low values of s but anti-competitive
for high values of s. As the value of d increases, we observe to things. First, average price is
uniformly higher. This is not surprising and corresponds to the standard oligopoly intuition
that greater asymmetry between firms leads to higher market power and consequently higher
prices. Second, we observe that a higher d also increases the slope of average price with
respect to s. In fact, if d is high enough (e.g., d = 1) then average price is increasing in s
even for low values of s.
One of the advantages of a closed-form solution is that we can make more complete
statements regarding comparative statics. Whereas in previous sections I was able to char-
acterize broadly the shape of comparative statics, I can now explicitly derive the second
cross partial derivative of average price p¯ with respect to s and d. It is given by
∂2 p¯
∂ s ∂ d
=
24 d
(
9 + 6 δ + 8 δ s (1− 2 δ))
(9− 8 δ s)3 (17)
It can be shown that 3 − 4 δ s > 0, a necessary condition for the solution to be interior,
implies that (17) is positive. In words, as the value of d increases, the impact of an increase
in s becomes less and less competitive (or more and more anti-competitive). Or, as Figure
4 confirms: for a given value of s, as we increase d, the slope of the average price curve
increases — eventually becoming positive.
9. I only plot points corresponding to an interior solution, that is, one where 0 < F (x) < 1.
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7. Endogenous asymmetric switching cost
Suppose that only seller A creates a switching cost. In other words, it costs sA for a
consumer to switch from seller A to seller B, but it costs zero for the consumer to switch
from seller B to seller A. As in the previous section, I need to keep track of the seller’s
identity. Moreover, I need to explicitly compute the buyer’s value functions. A buyer who
is currently locked-in to seller A, chooses seller A again if and only if
zA − p1A + β uA ≥ −sA + zB − p0B + β uB
If the buyer is locked-in to seller B, however, then he chooses seller B if and only if
zB − zA ≥ p1B − p0A − β uB + β uA
This implies that the critical values of the buyer’s relative preference leading to a switch
away from the insider seller are now given by
xA ≡ p1A − p0B − β uA + β uB − sA
xB ≡ p1B − p0A − β uB + β uA
(18)
As before, the insider seller’s demand is given by q1i = 1 − F (xi) = F (−xi), i = A,B. As
before, I attempt to evaluate the impact of increasing switching costs (unilaterally, in the
present context) on prices and profits.
Proposition 6. If sA is sufficiently small, then an increase in seller A’s switching cost sA
leads to
1. An decrease in average price.
2. An increase in seller A’s steady state value.
3. A decrease in seller B’s steady state value.
Proof: See Appendix.
Notice that point 2 in Proposition 6 is different, and stronger, than point 1 in Proposition
4. The latter refers to an increase in value by the insider seller, whereas the former refers
to an increase in value along the steady-state. Consider a seller with an equal number
of buyers who are locked in and buyers who are not locked in. In this case, Proposition
4 would predict a decline in seller value following a uniform increase in switching costs,
whereas Proposition 6 states that, in the steady state, seller value would increase following
a unilateral increase in switching cost.
Proposition 6 also suggests that the metagame where sellers choose levels of switching
cost has the nature of a prisoner’s dilemma. Specifically, consider the following metagame.
In a first stage, sellers simultaneously choose s ∈ {sL, sH}, where sH > sL and both sL
and sH are small. In a second stage, sellers play the infinite period game we have been
considering up to now. Then Propositions 2 and 6 imply that the metagame has the
structure of a prisoner’s dilemma: choosing sH is a dominant strategy for each seller (by
Proposition 6), but the payoff from (sH , sH) is lower than the payoff from (sL, sL) (by
Proposition 2).
This result bears some resemblance to Caminal and Matutes (1990) (see also Banerjee
and Summers, 1987), with the important difference that I consider an infinite period price
competition model rather than a two-period model.
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8. Discussion
In this section, I discuss the extent to which my results depend on consumer discounting,
product differentiation, and price discrimination. I also look at the issue of heterogeneous
switching costs as well as the role of market shares.
Consumer discounting. The effects of the seller’s discount factor has already been
discussed in previous sections. Basically, the greater δ, the greater the competition effect
is, which leads to more aggressive pricing. Consider now the effect of buyer discounting.
In Sections 6 and 7, I explicitly modeled the buyer’s dynamic problem. Specifically, buyers
discount the future according to discount factor β and compute the expected future value
of being attached to a given seller. What is the effect of buyer’s discount? In other words,
how does the effect of switching costs on prices depend on the extent to which buyers are
forward looking? In the proof of Proposition 5, I show that, as d → ∞ (that is, as one of
the sellers becomes arbitrarily large), then the derivative of average price with respect to
switching cost at s = 0 is given by
∂ p¯
∂ s
∣∣∣
s = 0
=
∂ p1A
∂ s
∣∣∣
s = 0
=
1
3
(1− 2 δ) (1 + β)
The above equation suggest that the effect of buyer discounting is to “magnify” the effect of
switching costs. In fact, as β changes from 0 to 1, the effect of switching costs is multiplied
by 2. Consider specifically the case when δ < 12 , such that that the harvesting effect
dominates and average price goes up as switching costs increase. Intuitively, a forward
looking buyer is more “locked in” to a dominant seller. The forward looking buyer knows
that it is being ripped off, but it also knows that switching is not going to be of much help,
since most likely the buyer will switch back to the dominant seller again, at a discounted
loss of β s. The higher β, the higher this loss is, and the less tempted to switch the buyer is.
This effect is similar to the role of consumer discounting discussed in Farrell and Klemperer
(2007) and Villas-Boas (2006).
Product differentiation. What is the effect of product differentiation? One natural
way of modeling product differentiation is to assume that the distribution of z is given
by F (z/σ). Whereas up to now we have implicitly assumed that σ = 1 (fixed degree of
product differentiation), we can now consider comparative statics with respect to the value
of σ. Notice that my limit results (small s, large s, large δ, large d) do not depend on
the shape of F (z) beyond what’s assumed in Assumption 1. In this sense, the results do
not depend on the degree of product differentiation. However, the value of d considered in
Section 6 is likely to be higher (on average) the higher the value of σ. In fact, the value of
d is best thought of as a random draw from F (z/σ). In this sense, we would predict that,
in markets with a greater degree of product differentiation, the effect of switching costs is
more anticompetitive.
Although the qualitative nature of my results does not depend on the value of σ, I should
note that there is an important discontinuity at σ = 0. So, a more precise statement would
be that the qualitative results do not depend on the value of σ so long as σ is positive. If
σ = 0, so that there is no residual product differentiation, then the insider seller sells with
probability 1 regardless of the level of switching cost. By contrast, if the degree of product
differentiation is strictly greater than zero, then, as the level of switching costs goes to zero
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the insider seller sells with probability 50%. This is one of the important differences of my
paper (as well as other papers that feature product differentiation) with respect to much
of the previous literature: because of residual product differentiation, switching does take
place along the equilibrium path.
Price discrimination. Although I make only very weak assumptions regarding the nature
of product differentiation, I do make some important assumptions regarding the nature of
pricing and the dynamics of buyer preferences. First, as mentioned in the introduction, I
assume that sellers can discriminate between buyers who are locked in and buyers who are
not. If sellers cannot discriminate, then we must simultaneously consider all buyers (not just
one) and the seller’s optimal price will strike a balance between harvesting locked-in buyers
and investing on new buyers. Beggs and Klemperer (1992) argue that the balance tends to
favor higher prices than without switching costs. The contrast between my result and that
of Beggs and Klemperer (1992) bears some relationship to the literature of oligopoly price
discrimination (Corts, 1998). When the technology of price discrimination allows firms to
target each others most loyal or locked-in consumers, oligopolists typically would like to
commit not to price discriminate as this would soften overall price competition.
Uncertain and heterogeneous switching cost. I have assumed throughout that the
value of s is known to buyer and sellers. In many real-world situations, the buyer has
better information about switching cost than sellers. Suppose that sellers believe that s
is distributed according to G(s), whereas the buyer knows the precise value of s. Assume
also that s is i.i.d. across periods and independent of buyer valuations zi. Then all of the
results in the paper go through if we redefine variables appropriately. First, we let s denote
the average of s (according to cdf G). Second, we denote by F (z) the convolution of the
original F (z) and the cdf G(s) shifted by the average of s. In other words, we can simply
include uncertainty about s in the overall uncertainty about valuations zi.
10
A related issue is that of heterogeneity in switching costs, that is, the case when different
buyers have different values of the switching cost. To the extent that sellers can discriminate
across buyers, the results in the paper still apply. If however discrimination is not possible,
then heterogeneity can matter a lot, especially in a dynamic context. This problem lies
beyond the scope of the present paper and is discussed in Biglaiser, Cre´mer and Dobos
(2010).
Market share and firm value. My assumption of price discrimination implies that I
can look at competition for each individual buyer. In aggregate terms, this leads to market
share effects similar to those in previous literature. As shown in Proposition 2, a small
increase in switching cost implies that the incumbent seller increases its price, whereas the
outsider seller decreases its price. Now consider a seller with a market share ν, that is, for
a fraction ν this seller is the inside seller. Then we can show that (a) seller average price
is linear and increasing in market share; (b) seller value is linear and increasing in market
share. Biglaiser, Cre´mer and Dobos (2010) also provide conditions under which firm value
is linear and increasing in market share.
10. This is related to the classical problem of estimating switching costs empirically, namely separating
switching costs from consumer heterogeneity.
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9. Conclusion
In a competitive environment, switching costs have two effects. First, they increase the
market power of a seller with locked-in customers. Second, they increase competition for
new customers. In this paper, I derived conditions under which switching costs decrease
or increase equilibrium prices. Overall, the paper’s message is that, if markets are very
competitive to begin with, then switching costs make them even more competitive; whereas
if markets are not very competitive to begin with, then switching costs make them even less
competitive. In the above statements, by “competitive” I mean a market that is close to a
symmetric duopoly or one where the sellers’ discount factor is very high.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: First notice that
F (z)2
f(z)
= F (z)
F (z)
f(z)
Since F (z) is increasing and F (z)f(z) is strictly increasing (by Assumption 1), it follows that the product
is strictly increasing.
Next notice that, by part (ii) Assumption 1,
F (z)− 1
f(z)
=
−F (−z)
f(z)
=
−F (−z)
f(−z)
Since F (z)f(z) is strictly increasing,
−F (−z)
f(−z) is strictly increasing too.
Next notice that
2F (z)− 1
f(z)
=
F (z)− 1
f(z)
+
F (z)
f(z)
I have just proved that F (z)−1f(z) is strictly increasing. We thus has the sum of two strictly increasing
functions, the result being a strictly increasing function.
Finally, taking the derivative of the fourth expression I get
d
d z
((
1− F (z))2 +(F (z))2
f(z)
)
=
=
(
− 2(1− F (z)) f(z) + 2F (z) f(z)) f(z)(
f(z)
)2 −
f ′(z)
((
1− F (z))2 +(F (z))2)(
f(z)
)2
= 4
(
F (z)− 1
2
)
− f ′(z) ξ
where ξ =
((
1− F (z))2 +(F (z))2) /(f(z))2 is positive. The result then follows from Assumption
1.
Proof of Proposition 4: From the proof of Proposition 1, we know that
v1 =
(
1− F (x))2
f(x)
+ δ v0
v0 =
F (x)2
f(x)
+ δ v0
(19)
where the value of x is given by
x+
2F (x)− 1
f(x)
= −s (20)
By Assumption 1 and Lemma 1, the left-hand side of (20) is increasing in x. It follows that, by the
implicit function theorem, x is decreasing in s. In particular ∂ x / ∂ s |
s = 0
= − 13 .
Lemma 1 also implies that F (x)2/f(x) is increasing in x and (1− F (x))2/f(x) decreasing in x.
From (19), this implies that v0 is decreasing in x, whereas v1 is increasing in x if and only if δ is
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sufficiently low. Specifically, at s = 0 we have
∂ v0
∂ s
=
1
1− δ
∂ x
∂ s
∂ v1
∂ s
=
(
1 + δ
−1
1− δ
)
∂ x
∂ s
= −1− 2 δ
1− δ
∂ x
∂ s
∂ (v0 + v1)
∂ s
=
2 δ
1− δ
∂ x
∂ s
Since ∂ x / ∂ s < 0, we conclude that, at s = 0, both v0 and v0 + v1 are decreasing in s, whereas v1
is increasing in s if and only if δ < 12 .
Next consider consumer welfare. Recall that the distribution of zi (i = A,B) is given by φ(zi)
and define
E(z) ≡
∫
zi−zj≥z
zi dΦ(zi) dΦ(zj)
In words, E(z) is the buyer’s expected valuation given that he chooses a particular seller by using
the threshold z of differences in valuations (times the probability of choosing that particular seller).
Per period expected consumer surplus is given by
u = E(x) + E(−x)−(1− F (x)) p1 − F (x) (p0 + s) (21)
Notice that if E(x) is the expected value of zi given that zi − zj ≥ x, then E(−x) is the expected
value of zj given that zj − zi ≥ −x, where the latter is the same condition as zi − zj ≤ x, that is,
the negation of zi − zj ≥ x. Define
e(z) ≡ dE(z)
d z
Differentiating (21) with respect to s, we get
∂ u
∂ s
=
(
e(x)− e(−x) + f(x) (p1 − p0 − s)
) ∂ x
∂ s
−(1− F (x)) ∂ p1
∂ s
− F (x) ∂ p0
∂ s
− F (x)
Evaluating at s = 0, we get
∂ u
∂ s
∣∣∣∣
s = 0
= −∂ p¯
∂ s
− 1
2
Differentiating (8) we get ∂ x / ∂ s = − 13 . Differentiating (9), we get ∂ p¯∂ x = 2 δ. It follows that
∂ u
∂ s
∣∣∣∣
s = 0
=
2
3
δ − 1
2
It follows that consumer surplus increases if and only if δ > 34 . Finally, the result regarding total
welfare is trivial: since the market is covered, all price effects are simply a transfer between buyers
and sellers. The net effects on consumer welfare come from “transportation cost” (an effect of second
order at s = 0) and switching costs (a first-order effect). This implies that an increase in s has a
first-order negative effect on total welfare.
Proof of Proposition 5: Seller i’s value functions (i = A,B; j 6= i) are given by
v1i =
(
1− F (xi)
)(
p1i + δ v1i
)
+ F (xi) δ v0i
v0i = F (xj)
(
p0i + δ v1i
)
+
(
1− F (xj)
)
δ v0i
(22)
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The corresponding first-order conditions are
−f(xi)
(
p1i + δ v1i
)
+ 1− F (xi) + f(xi) δ v0i = 0
−f(xj)
(
p0i + δ v1i
)
+ F (xj) + f(xj) δ v0i = 0
Solving for p1i, p0i, we get
p1i =
1− F (xi)
f(xi)
− δ Vi
p0i =
F (xj)
f(xj)
− δ Vi
(23)
where Vi ≡ v1i − v0i. Substituting (23) for pki in (22), I get
v1i =
(
1− F (xi)
)2
f(xi)
+ δ v0i
v0i =
F (xj)
2
f(xj)
+ δ v0i
(24)
and so
Vi = v1i − v0i =
(
1− F (xi)
)2
f(xi)
− F (xj)
2
f(xj)
(25)
Substituting (25) for Vi in (23), we get
p1i =
1− F (xi)
f(xi)
− δ
(
1− F (xi)
)2
f(xi)
+ δ
F (xj)
2
f(xj)
p0i =
F (xj)
f(xj)
− δ
(
1− F (xi)
)2
f(xi)
+ δ
F (xj)
2
f(xj)
(26)
This parallels the derivation starting in (4), only that now value functions and prices are indexed
by seller identity.
Next consider the buyer value functions, ui, which I measure before the buyer learns his valuations
zA, zB . The values of ui are recursively given by
ui = E(xi) + E(−xi) +
(
1− F (xi)
)(
di − p1i + β ui
)
+ F (xi)
(
dj − s− p0j + β uj
)
(27)
i = A,B, j 6= i.
Recall that the preference thresholds are given by
xA ≡ p1A − p0B − β (uA − uB)− s− d
xB ≡ p1B − p0A + β (uA − uB)− s+ d
(28)
Notice that, as d → ∞, xA → −∞ and xB → +∞.11 This implies that, in the limit as d → ∞,
F (xA)→ 0 and F (xB)→ 1.
In what follows, I use the notation, for a generic variable x,
x˙ ≡ lim
d→∞
d x
d s
11. To see why, suppose that xA and xB remain bounded while d → ∞. Then from (26) and (27) all
prices and value functions are bounded, which by (28) contradicts the hypothesis that xi are bounded.
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Taking derivatives of (26) with respect to s and then limits as d→∞ I get
p˙1A = −x˙A − 2 δ x˙A + 2 δ x˙B
p˙0A = +x˙B − 2 δ x˙A + 2 δ x˙B
p˙1B = −x˙B
p˙0B = +x˙A
(29)
Taking derivatives of (27) with respect to s and then limits as d→∞ I get
u˙A = −p˙1A + β u˙A
u˙B = −1− p˙0A + β u˙A
(30)
where I note that limxi→∞ e(xi) = limxi→∞ e(−xi) = 0. Taking derivatives of (28) with respect to
s and then limits as d→∞ I get
x˙A ≡ p˙1A − p˙0B − β (u˙A − u˙B)− 1
x˙B ≡ p˙1B − p˙0A + β (u˙A − u˙B)− 1
(31)
The system formed by (29), (30) and (31) includes 8 equations and 8 unknowns. Solving form p˙1A,
I get
p˙1A =
1
3
(1− 2 δ) (1 + β)
Since q1A → 1 and q0B → 1 as d → 1, average price is determined by p1A, whereas changes in
average price are determined by p˙1A. The result follows.
Proof of Proposition 6: The buyer’s value functions, measured before the buyer learns his valuations
zA, zB , are recursively given by
uA = E(xA) + E(−xA) +
(
1− F (xA)
)(− p1A + δ uA)+ F (xA)(− sA − p0B + β uB)
uB = E(xB) + E(−xB) +
(
1− F (xB)
)(− p1B + δ uB)+ F (xB)(− p0A + β uA)
In what follows, I use the notation, for a generic variable x,
xˆ ≡ d x
d sA
∣∣∣∣
sA = 0
Note that, at sA = 0, we have a symmetric outcome where xA = xB = 0, uA = uB = u, and
p1A = p0B = p0A = p1B = p. Differentiating the buyer value functions with respect to sA at sA = 0
and defining e(x) ≡ dE(x)d x , I then get
uˆA = e(0) xˆA − e(0) xˆA + 1
2
(− pˆ1A + β uˆA)− f(0) xˆA(− p+ β u)+
+
1
2
(− 1− pˆ0B + β uˆB)+ f(0) xˆA(− p+ β u)
=
1
2
(
β uˆA + β uˆB − pˆ1A − pˆ0B − 1
)
uˆB =
1
2
(
β uˆA + β uˆB − pˆ1B − pˆ0A
)
(32)
This is intuitive: a buyer’s expected valuation increases by the increase in future expected valuation,
δ 12 (uˆA+ uˆB), minus the increase in expected price paid this period, which is given by
1
2 (pˆ1A+ pˆ0B)
if the buyer is attached to seller A and 12 (pˆ1B + pˆ0A) if the buyer is attached to seller B. Moreover, if
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the buyer is attached to seller A, buyer welfare further decreases by an additional 12 s, the probability
that an immediate switch to seller B will take place.
Differentiating (18) with respect to sA at sA = 0, I get
xˆA = pˆ1A − pˆ0B − β (uˆA − uˆB)− 1
xˆB = pˆ1B − pˆ0A − β (uˆB − uˆA)
(33)
The derivation of value functions and first-order conditions is identical to those in the proof of Propo-
sition 5, leading to (26), with the difference that the values of xi are now different. Differentiating
with respect to sA at sA = 0, and noting that f
′(0) = 0, I get
pˆ1i = −(1− δ) xˆi + δ xˆj
pˆ0i = δ xˆi + (1 + δ) xˆj
(34)
The system formed by (32), (33) and (34) includes 8 equations and 8 unknowns. Its solution is given
by
pˆ1A =
1
3
(
1− δ (1− β)− β/2
)
pˆ0A = −1
3
(
δ (1− β)− β/2
)
pˆ1B = −1
3
(
δ (1− β) + β/2
)
pˆ0B = −1
3
(
1 + δ (1− β)− β/2
)
(35)
Recall that these are variations with respect to the equilibrium values at sA = 0. The above values
indicate that seller A, by creating a switching cost sA, is able to increase its price when the buyer
is locked-in, specifically by 12
(
1− δ) dsA. If the buyer is locked-in to seller B, however, then seller
A must decrease its price by δ2 dsA.
In a steady state and with sA = 0, all prices are paid by the consumer with equal probability.
It follows that
∂ p¯
∂ s
= −1
3
δ (1− β) (36)
Differentiating (24), we get
vˆ1i = −xˆi + δ vˆ0i
vˆ0i = xˆj + δ vˆ0i
Substituting (35) for xˆi, xˆj and solving, we get
vˆ1A = γ
(
1 + (1− β) (1− 2 δ)
)
vˆ0A = γ β
vˆ1B = −γ
(
1− (1− β) (1− 2 δ)
)
vˆ0B = −γ (2− β)
where γ ≡ 16 (1−δ) .
At sA = 0, both states are visited with equal probability. It follows that steady state values are
given by
ˆ¯vA =
1
2
(
vˆ0A + vˆ1A
)
=
1
6
(
1 + β
δ
1− δ
)
ˆ¯vB =
1
2
(
vˆ0B + vˆ1B
)
= −1 + δ (1− β)
6 (1− δ)
ˆ¯v =
1
4
(
vˆ0A + vˆ1A + vˆ0B + vˆ1B
)
= −δ (1− β)
6 (1− δ)
(37)
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Equations (36) and (37) imply the result.
Closed form solution in linear case (cf Section 6). Substituting F (x) = 12 + x in (25), we get
v1i − v0i =
(
1
2
− xi
)2
−
(
1
2
+ xj
)2
=(xi + xj) (xi − xj − 1) (38)
Substituting (38) for v1i − v0i and F (x) = 12 + x in (23), we get
p1i =
1
2
− xi − δ (xi + xj) (xi − xj − 1)
p0i =
1
2
+ xj − δ (xi + xj) (xi − xj − 1)
which implies
p1A − p0B =
(
1
2
− xA − δ (xA + xB) (xA − xB − 1)
)
−
(
1
2
+ xA − δ (xA + xB) (xB − xA − 1)
)
= −2xA − 2 δ (xA + xB) (xA − xB)
p1B − p0A =
(
1
2
− xB − δ (xA + xB) (xB − xA − 1)
)
−
(
1
2
+ xA − δ (xA + xB) (xA − xB − 1)
)
= −2xB − 2 δ (xA + xB) (xB − xA)
Plugging this back into (16), we get
xA = −2xA − 2 δ (xA + xB) (xA − xB)− s− d
xB = −2xB − 2 δ (xA + xB) (xB − xA)− s+ d
(39)
From this we get
xA − xB = −2 (xA − xB)− 4 δ (xA + xB) (xA − xB)− 2 d
xA + xB = −2 (xA + xB)− 2 s
Solving the system with respect to xA + xB and xA − xB , we get
xA + xB = −2
3
s
xA − xB = −2
(
3− 8
3
δ s
)−1
d
xA = −1
3
s−
(
3− 8
3
δ s
)−1
d
xB = −1
3
s+
(
3− 8
3
δ s
)−1
d
Substituting these equations for xi in the above price equations and simplifying we get the expressions
in the text.
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